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When toward the end of  his long life, John Kenneth Galbraith was asked what 
social change he had found most remarkable, he responded that it was the “decline of  
the Catholic Church as a critical institution in American life.” 1
Whatever our views of  organized religion, Galbraith’s larger point is difficult 
to deny.  We are living at a time when the spiritual truths and ancient verities upon 
which our civilization have been built have crumbled away before the tribunal of  
reason and science.  So even as our civilization progresses in many ways, there is a 
very real enervation of  the spirit, as individuals struggle for meaning in a cold and 
impersonal universe.  What is to be done?
As a point of  entry into this debate, I want to borrow from a book by Charles 
Taylor, The Malaise of  Modernity.2  Taylor points out that the achievements of  modernity 
– by which he means the world from the 17th Century on – have come at a cost. So 
while it is undeniably true that the material conditions of  living have greatly improved 
for the vast majority of  peoples, the rise of  science and the subsequent “disenchantment 
of  the world” 3 pose a real challenge to human well-being. Older systems of  meaning 
no longer resonate with us; the ancient rituals and symbols which once carried with 
them enormous significance have been stripped bare.  There appears little in our world 
which cannot be subjected to a cost-benefit analysis. 
For Taylor, reason has become instrumentalized, restricted to the service 
of  science. Whereas thinkers of  every previous age have stressed the importance of  
rational deliberation concerning how best we ought to live, in our own day reason 
has been confined to directing only the means of  existence, never its ends. On the 
substantive question of  how, ideally, we should live our lives, on what goals are worth 
pursuing, reason has been rendered silent. 
Thus whatever values we choose to pursue are, to the degree that they are no 
longer tied to the rational faculties – entirely arbitrary.  Traditionally, moral positions 
were said to be grounded either in reason or in the nature of  things.  Now, however, 
moral positions are “ultimately just adopted by each of  us because we find ourselves 
1 John Kenneth Galbraith, A Life in Our Times.  Toronto:  Random House, 1981.
2 Charles Taylor, The Malaise of Modernity.  Toronto: Anansi, 1991.
3 Op. Cit. p. 3.  Taylor borrows the phrase from Max Weber.  Weber argued that the rise of capitalism, 
bureaucracy and the modern, rational-legal state had discredited older orders of meaning, particularly 
those supposedly based on a sacred origin.  Such older orders gave meaning to the world and regulated 
the norms and rituals of social life; but the sacred myths which undergirded these orders were unable to 
withstand the onslaught of modern science and rational enquiry, and so became “disenchanted.”   
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drawn to them.  On this view, reason can’t adjudicate moral disputes.”4  Does one 
embrace a fundamentalist faith or philosophy? Should one dedicate oneself  to good 
works or pursue a life of  unending hedonism? Is it best to emulate the life of  Nelson 
Mandela or The Marquis de Sade?  All such ethical questions are laid on a Procrustean 
Bed, where the only answer we are able to give is that of  the emotivist: it is really just 
a matter of  individual preference and valuations, no different from the fact that some 
prefer chocolate ice-cream while others prefer vanilla.   In the realm of  values, reason 
is mute. Beyond the scientific realm, we no longer recognize objective truths. 
And it needs to be emphasized that evaluations of  any description -- 
whether moral, ethical, or aesthetic -- are understood as mere expressions of  personal 
preference. Does one prefer Charles Dickens or Danielle Steele?  Mozart or Motley 
Crue?  The soup cans of  Andy Warhol or a Carravagio?  
According to Taylor, this “slide to subjectivism”5 results in two insidious social 
effects.  The first is that we have made self-fulfillment the holy grail of  modern life.6 
Secondly, this “single-minded pursuit of  self-development”7 has created what the social 
critic Christopher Lasch called the “culture of  narcissism”.8 Both these developments 
celebrate the individual at the expense of  the community and social solidarity, and 
both encourage what might be called “social solipsism” (if  such a thing is conceivable), 
where there is no “thou”, but only the ever-present “I”. 
This narcissistic self-absorption (or self-indulgence) is the dark side to 
individualism, and it runs the danger of  creating a society where, as Tocqueville 
famously remarked, each is “enclosed in his own heart”9 and where individuals pursue 
their own private pleasures and satisfactions at the expense of  the commonweal. 
In broad strokes then, this is how Taylor rather pessimistically characterizes 
our current cultural situation. It is, of  course, an analysis which is not without 
controversy.  And it is easy to forget that the opposite of  individualism is not necessarily 
a romanticized, communal solidarity, but very frequently the hysteria of  the masses or 
the claustrophobia of  the small town.  
4 Op. Cit., p. 18
5 Op. Cit., p. 55
6 Our media is constantly filled with bizarre accounts of the lengths to which some individuals go in 
order to “find themselves.”  But what strikes one most forcibly about such modern accounts is that the 
notion of “finding oneself” is construed as a voyage of a subjective inner-movement, of “looking within”.  
In contrast, for the Greeks knowing thyself was not the creed of the subjectivist, but rather a call to 
actively engage in community and in action, for it was only in the polis that one could truly come to know 
oneself.  Modernity, by contrast, breaks the bonds of community, so that each of us, in his or her own 
solitary way, radically pursues our own good and idea of self-fulfillment, while denying our ties to others. 
7 Op. Cit, p. 57
8 Christopher Lasch, The Culture of Narcissism.  New York:  W.W. Norton, 1991.
9 Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America.  Toronto: Penguin Books, 2003.
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But on one count of  his indictment, I think Taylor is absolutely correct: we in 
the west, having voided all older systems of  their meaning, are still left with an all too 
human yearning for seeking a higher meaning to our lives. We still possess the human 
longing to seek connection with a transcendent wider whole and a greater truth. 
What has changed however – and radically so -- is that the conceptual 
resources available to us in the public realm preclude precisely this sort of  enquiry. 
And it is at this juncture that I think education – and in particular university education 
-- must confront the hollowness of  contemporary life.
But to do so, we need to recapture the essence of  humanistic learning. In 
higher education, liberal learning is rapidly giving way to new forms of  an industrialized 
utilitarianism where the only educational aims which we entertain as valid ones are 
those which are linked to the job market.  We increasingly see education merely as a 
means to the economic end of  securing employment; one pursues an “education” – 
not to wrestle with existential questions, or to discover how one ideally should live, or 
to ponder exemplary human possibilities – but in order to secure a job.  Similarly, the 
notion of  studying anything for its intrinsic value, for the sheer joy and pleasure that 
such study brings, is rapidly giving way to a new sort of  industrial utilitarianism, where 
the only learning that is considered worthwhile is that which is directly linked to the 
economy. 
In brief, I fear that we’ve allowed our once proud Canadian tradition of  
education to become a synonym for what, in a former age, was more accurately and 
more honestly called “job-training.” We conflate the educational mission of  our schools 
with a vocational imperative, so that our schools, at every level from kindergarten to 
graduate school, are seen as institutions whose only mandate is preparing students for 
the job market.  One of  the unfortunate consequences is that our schools have become 
more and more concerned with credentials and diplomas, with providing students with 
marketable trades and skills, and less concerned with cultivating in students that same, 
pure, desire to know that Aristotle spoke of  as the defining characteristic of  the human 
condition. 
But for some time I have detected in students a desire and thirst for what 
might be loosely termed “spiritual” kinds of  knowledge and understanding, those 
understandings which ignore the values of  the marketplace, and speak immediately 
and directly to the perennial human aspirations, imaginings and desires.  Students 
long for visions of  an exemplary way of  life -- an understanding of  what values and 
purposes are best worth pursuing and how such values might best be realized.  And 
they deserve the chance to approach these questions in an organized and disciplined 
fashion. 
In the mad rush to vocationalism in higher education, we are in danger of  
forgetting that there exists in all of  us a desire for learning and knowledge that is not 
bound to the acquisition of  marketable skills, and that this desire corresponds to a 
very noble part of  our psychic makeup. Learning is, in and of  itself, an intrinsically 
rewarding experience, one which makes us more fully and completely human. 
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Education is a notoriously vexed and contested concept.  But its essence is 
perhaps best captured by Leo Strauss: “Education consists of  learning to read what 
the best minds have said about the most serious questions.”10 And no question is more 
serious than how one ought to live.  For too long, we in higher education have allowed 
this question to be pushed to the margins.  It is time that we once again afford it its 
central and time-honoured place.   
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